

bus) is one-sided and fails to correspond to the genuine ranks among the order of values. This is the case because his idea of the person is determined by the *heroic* type. If Nietzsche was unable to do justice to the ideas of *genius* and *saint*—in relation to the hero—as guidelines for human becoming and as the fruit and the most concentrated *meaning* of basic types of human communalization, it was because of the erroneous *biological* foundations on which he sought to place *all* ethics.

ad 4. Individual Person and Collective Person

Just as the person discovers every psychic experience against the cogiven background of a stream of such experiences, and every object of outer perception against the background of and as a “part” of a nature that is spatially and temporally endless,¹⁶³ so also in every execution of an act is the person given to himself in self-experience as a *member* of a *community of persons which encompasses him*. Whatever the type of this community, simultaneity and succession (of generations) are at first still *undifferentiated*. From an ethical viewpoint this experience of a person’s necessary membership in a social sphere appears in the *coresponsibility* for the total effective activity of the sphere. With regard to the possible factualness of community, it appears in *re-experiencing and coexperiencing, refeeling and cofeeling*, as the basic acts of inner perception of the other. At least the very *sense* of community and its *possible* existence is not an assumption that requires empirical establishment, because in certain classes of acts the intention toward a possible community is cogiven *by essential necessity* with the nature of these acts themselves. It is, rather, an assumption that is conjoined with the sense of a *person as originally and essentially* as it is with that of the *outer and inner worlds*.

A great deal of importance rests on this *equal originality*. For the existence or the position of “community” in general is neither ethically nor epistemologically conjoined with the existence (or the position) of a *world of bodies* (as I have shown in the appendix to my work on sympathetic feelings). And this is also the *highest* philosophical reason why the sciences of community and history and their basic givens are not dependent on the natural sciences and *their* basic givens; the former are “autonomous” with respect to the latter. The constitution of the concep-

163. [See chap. 6, A, sec. 3, g.—Ed.]

tual unities of these human sciences—the unities of simultaneity as well as those of succession, e.g., family, tribe, people, nation, cultural unit, or age, period, etc.—does not require any regression to existing scientific unities of reality, for example, to those of geography (territories), or to scientific-biological theories of race. Basic details in this regard must be more closely investigated in the philosophy of history and sociology. Only a mundane *correlate* is necessarily in the essence of a social unit. But the assumption (G. Berkeley and J. G. Fichte) according to which the existence and assumption of an objectively real world of bodies with their own laws can be *founded* only on the existence and assumption of a social unit—an X, for example, identical and identifiable for the members of a social unit, or the mere “material” of a consciousness of duty leading primarily to the assumption of a community—is untenable.¹⁶⁴

However, as we have shown, the existence and assumption of a community is not founded on the existence or position of an objective *inner world* or of something psychic.¹⁶⁵ Understanding and coexperiencing (including the inner self-perception of the other) necessarily preclude such objectification, although they are the first condition of knowledge of the other’s psychic sphere. And one’s own psychic sphere is constituted only in differentiating it from that of the other.

Hence both community and history are psychophysically *in-different* concepts.

Thus not only does everyone discover himself against a background of, and at the same time as a “member” of, a totality of interconnections of experience which have somehow become concentrated, and which are *called* in their temporal extension *history*, in their simultaneous extension *social unity*; but as a moral subject in this whole, everyone is *also* given as a “person *acting with others*,” as a “man with others,” and as “coresponsible” for everything morally relevant in this totality.

We must designate as *collective persons* the various *centers of experiencing* [Er-lebens] in this endless totality of living with one another, insofar as these centers fully correspond to the definitions of the person which we gave earlier.

164. Such a deduction can be found in Fichte’s *Naturrecht*. Hugo Münsterberg has followed him on this point.

165. See *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle*, app., and what I have said on W. Dilthey in my essay, “Versuche einer Philosophie des Lebens” (Bibliog. no. 10). [See *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pt. C, chap. 3.—Ed.]

As we said above, according to its meaning a social unit is a totality *without an end*. Just as it belongs to the essence of every finite person of a social unit, and to the nature of any social unit, to be a partial manifestation of a concrete collective person, so also does it belong to the essence of any given *social unit* to be a *member* of a social unit encompassing it, and to the essence of any kind of a given *collective person* also or simultaneously to be a *member* of a collective person encompassing it. These are strictly a priori propositions that compel us, by virtue of their apriority, to transcend in spirit any given, factual, earthly community, i.e., to see it as a member of a community encompassing it. Whether or not this transcending act finds "fulfillment" in a factual experience is of no consequence for the sense and nature of this "consciousness-of." An imaginary Robinson Crusoe endowed with cognitive-theoretical faculties would also coexperience his *being a member of a social unit* in his experiencing the *lack* of fulfillment of acts of act-types constituting a person in general.¹⁶⁶ For it is by virtue of their intentional *essence*, and not on the basis of their contingent *objects* or what they empirically have in common, that these acts are factual acts, that is, *social acts*, acts that find their fulfillment only in a possible community. Among these acts are acts of the true *kinds* of love (which are listed in the above-mentioned work); such acts are capable of and require "fulfillment," and I have distinguished them from all differentiations of love resulting from the nature of factual and experienced objects.¹⁶⁷ Acts of commanding, obeying, ordering, promising, vowing, and co-feeling also belong to this class. In contrast to these are acts of a *singularizing* nature (consciousness of self, self-esteem, self-love, scrutinizing one's conscience, etc.) and acts that are indifferent to these two directions (e.g., judging). Therefore, the being of the person as individual person is constituted within a person and a world in general in the special essential class of singularizing acts; the being of the collective person, in the special essential class of social acts. The

166. For more details, see *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle*, pp. 96 ff. [See *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pt. B, chap. 6, sec. 3.—Ed.]

167. For example, a mother's love, sexual love, love for one's country and home, and also love of humanity and God. These kinds of love are essentially different from one another independent of their objects and the discovery of their objects; they only find their "fulfillment" or "non-fulfillment" in such objects. See *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle*, pp. 73 ff. [See *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pt. B, chap. 4.—Ed.]

world of a community is the *total* content of all experiencing of the kind "experiencing with one another" (in relation to which "understanding" is only a secondary kind). This is the *collective world*, which has as its concrete subject on the act side the *collective person*. The world of the individual, the *individual world*, is the content of all experiencing in singularizing acts and acts of experiencing-for-oneself. This is the *singular world*, which has as its concrete subject on the act side the *individual person*. Hence an individual person *and* a collective person "belong" to every *finite* person. Both factors are essentially necessary sides of a concrete whole of person and world. Thus individual and collective persons can be related to each other *within* every possible concrete finite person, and the relation of one to the other is experienceable. The collective person with its world is not the result of any kind of "synthesis" which it or even an individual person must undertake; it is, on the contrary, an experienced *reality*. The collective person is not a kind of "sum" or a kind of artificial¹⁶⁸ or real collection¹⁶⁹ of individual persons, nor are its properties composed of properties of individual persons; the collective person is not contained "first" in individual persons, nor is the world of the collective person the sum of the worlds of individual persons, not even in some first stage. Hence *no inference* of any sort and no act of constructive "synthesis" are required in order to arrive at the reality of a collective person. Such acts come into question only for the establishment of the special world-content of a collective person.

It is therefore *in* the person that the mutually related *individual person* and *collective person* become differentiated. The idea of one is not the "foundation" of the other. The collective or group person is not composed of individual persons in the sense that it derives its existence from such a composition; nor is the collective person a result of the merely reciprocal agency of individual persons or (subjectively and in cognition) a result of a synthesis of arbitrary additions. It is an experienced *reality*, and not a construction, although it is a starting point for constructions of all types.

If one asks whether the collective person has a "consciousness-of" that is *different* from and *independent* of the consciousness-of of the individual person, the answer depends on the meaning of the question. No doubt the collective person does

168. Like a statistical unity.

169. Like the collective *thing* of the heaven of stars.

possess a "consciousness-of" that is different from and independent of the consciousness-of of the *individual* person.

This proposition will appear paradoxical only to someone who would base the differentiation of consciousness in general on the separation of lived bodies or to someone who would base the concept of the person on the concept of a soul-substance.¹⁷⁰ The mistake of such assumptions was shown before. Inasmuch as the collective person is constituted in mutual coexperiencing of persons, and inasmuch as the person is the concrete act-center of the experience *in* this mutual coexperiencing, the consciousness-of of the collective person is *always contained* in the consciousness of a total finite person as *act-direction*. It is not something transcendent to it. Yet it is not the case that a certain finite total person must also have a reflective consciousness of the contents that he contingently experiences in mutual coexperiencing. Nor is it the case that his experience can encompass the *collective content* which is experienced by the collective person and to which the person *also* belongs as a member-person. Indeed, the person's peculiar awareness that he can never encompass the total contents of the experience of the collective person to which he belongs is a part of the *essence* of this experienced relation in which both member-person and collective person are given. The collective person with its world is *not fully* experienced in *any* of its member-persons; it is given as something going beyond the member-persons in terms of duration, content, and range of effectiveness. Indeed, it belongs to the essence of all collective persons to have member-persons who are *also* individual persons; but the collective person's existence, with its strict continuity as a collective person, is not connected with the existence of the same individual persons. In relation to the collective person the latter are freely variable and, in principle, replaceable. Through death and in other ways they lose their membership in the collective person.¹⁷¹ And the same individual

170. A collective soul-substance is, of course, nonsense.

171. Above all, one must be careful not to regard the collective person as an individual person of only wider scope, whether consciously or implicitly, and thus attribute to it the kind of consciousness which can be attributed *only* to individual persons. If one does this, it is easy to show that the collective person cannot have a consciousness, or that this assumption is but a "mysterious" assertion. This mistake would be analogous to the one with which Husserl rightly charged Berkeley. Berkeley maintained that it is necessary to represent to oneself "one" triangle which is neither right-angled nor oblique-angled and yet both at the same time in order to demonstrate the existence of the species. If one does not consider the fact that special singular acts are necessary to reveal the

persons can also belong to different collective persons, for example, to a nation and to a church.

It would appear that in making these statements we have simply sided with Aristotle in the old philosophical dispute between the Aristotelian doctrine, according to which man as a rational being is by nature a ζῶον πολιτικόν,¹⁷² and the doctrine first formulated by the Epicureans, according to which community is first constituted by some form of *contract*. But this is true only in a negative way inasmuch as we must reject the theory of a contract in any of its three possible forms: as a genetic theory, as a theory of origin, or as a theoretical standard (according to which only the type of order of a community is to be assessed against the idea of a contract). But in a positive sense our views do not confirm Aristotle's. For Aristotle, the individual person is not equal in origin to the whole. He is, rather, derived from it—essentially, not historically. The person becomes a person by being a member of a community (first of all, the state) and does not have an independent value of his own apart from his value as member. In our view, however, all persons are, with *equal* originality, both individual persons and (essentially) members of a collective person. And one's own value as an individual person is independent of his value as a member-person. Second, Aristotle does not recognize the concept of a collective *person*. Also, *logos*, *form*, and ratio are, for Aristotle, *over and above* the idea of a *person*, a principle that is typically held by the ancients (even in their theories about God). The state, too, is viewed not as a sovereign personal will but only as the form and rational order of a people's community based on laws. However, we remain convinced that the community has its ultimate foundation in the idea of the *person*; and we maintain that it is not values of the community but values of the *person* that are the highest values, and that the highest values *among* values of the com-

givenness of the individual person, one is easily led into a metaphysical hypostatization of the individual person which does not allow one to accept a collective person unless the latter is falsely interpreted simply as an individual person of wider scope.

172. Aristotle's expression means something very different from what historians and economists (especially those of the historical school), with their complete lack of knowledge of philosophy, say that it does: the mere trivial recognition of the (questionable!) fact that there is no isolated living man—a fact never denied by the subtle representatives of the theory of the contract. Aristotle means that it belongs to the essence "man" = bearer of *voûs* (*anima rationalis*) to be a member of a state-community and to know himself as such, no matter to what extent he may *in fact* live alone.

munity are those belonging to the collective *person*. And so the relation between the collective person and the individual person does not represent a special kind of relation between the universal and the individual; the collective person (apart from the concepts of it, such as state, nation, church) is as much a spiritual *individual* as the individual person, e.g., the Prussian state.¹⁷³ From an ethical point of view there is for us no relation of subordination between the individual person and the collective person. Rather, both have a *common* ethical subordination to the idea of an infinite person in whom the division between individual persons and collective persons, necessary for finite persons, *ceases to be*. Therefore the Godhead, according to its very idea, cannot be conceived either as an individual person (which would be henotheism, and not monotheism) or as the highest collective person (pantheism). It can be conceived only as *the* ("singular," not numerically "one") infinite person.

From this it follows, of course, that not *all* kinds of social unity are unities that may be called collective *persons* (insofar as we use "social" to designate the most general and undifferentiated combinations of men).

One must fully develop a *theory of all possible essential social units* to be applied to the understanding of factual social units (marriage, family, people, nation, etc.). This is the basic problem of philosophical sociology and the presupposition of any social ethics. As we mentioned in the Preface, we are planning to develop this discipline in a special work. Let it suffice here to mention the principles of division of such a theory of the essence of the social and its chief result, so that we may get to the deeper foundation of the concept of the collective person. The first such principle deals with the essentially different *kinds of being with one another* and experiencing one another through which a specific kind of social unity is constituted. The second principle deals with the kind and rank of *values* in whose direction the member-persons of a social unit see "with one another" so that they may act according to norms that conform to those values. As is the case with all non-inductive concepts and propositions,

173. It is the tension between Christianity (especially its theory of individuality and the infinite value of every "soul," as well as its incorporation of each person into *two* basic communities, state *and* church) and the ancient idea of community and partnership that historically led to the *depth* of this problem—a depth which those who want to return to the ancient idea of the state in some form and those who want to renovate the theory of contract in some form on Christian bases (e.g., the Calvinists) completely miss.

these essential social units and their interconnections are never purely and fully realized in factual experience; but since they function as the *condition* for the objective possibility of this experience, they serve in their being understood.

According to the first of these principles, we make the following distinctions in conformity with the detailed, but not quite sufficient, preliminary work, *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle*, especially its appendix.¹⁷⁴

1. A social unit is constituted (simultaneously) in so-called contagion and involuntary imitation devoid of understanding.¹⁷⁵ Such a unit of animals is called the *herd*, of men, the *mass*. With respect to its members, the mass possesses a reality of its own and has its own laws of effectiveness.

2. A social unit is constituted in *that* kind of coexperiencing or reliving (cofeeling, costriving, cothinking, cojudging, etc.) which reveals some "*understanding*" of the members of this unit (distinguishing it from the mass). However, this understanding is not that which would precede this coexperiencing as a separate act, but that which occurs *in* coexperiencing *itself*. In particular, here there is no "*understanding*" in whose acts a member coexperiences his individual *egoness* as the starting point of such acts; still less is the other being *objectified* (which distinguishes this unit from society). It is in this immediate experience and understanding, in which (as I have shown in the work mentioned) there is *no division* of any kind between the experience of self and that of the other or between bodily expression and experience in the comprehension of member A and that of member B, that the basic social unit which I call the *life-community* (in the pregnant sense) is constituted. The *content* of this coexperiencing is, in the "*community*," truly *identical* content. Any attempt to "*explain*" this peculiar phenomenon of "*coexperiencing something*" by saying that A experiences something that is experienced by B, and that both, in addition, *know* of their experiencing it, or that they only "*take part*" in their experiences in terms of a mere "*cofeeling-with*," would be a fully erroneous construction.¹⁷⁶ If one looks away from the *uniform actus* of coexperiencing and toward (objective) individuals and their experiences, this *actus*

174. [See *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pt. C, chap. 3.—Ed.]

175. On the psychological mechanism of these processes, see the above-mentioned work. [See *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pt. A, chap. 2.—Ed.]

176. See *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle*, p. 9. [See *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pt. A, chap. 2.—Ed.]

(and the ever changing structure) of coliving, cohearing, coseeing, cothinking, cohoping, coloving, and cohating hovers between these individuals like a *stream of experience which has its own laws* and whose subject is the reality of the community itself.¹⁷⁷ Hence, given the basis of the "community," mutual understanding among members requires *no inferences* from expression to experience; their common knowledge of the truth, *no criteria of truth* and no artificial terminology; and the formation of the common will, no promises and no contracts.

Whereas there is no solidarity in the social unit of the mass because the individual does not exist at all as an experience and therefore cannot possess solidarity with others, there is a special *form* of solidarity in a life-community which, in contrast to another higher form (as we shall see), may be called *representable solidarity*. This solidarity arises on the basis of the fact that, although the experiences of the individual are given *as* such experiences, they vary with regard to course and content in their total dependency on the variations of collective experience. True, the experiences of an individual are given to him as single experiences, but only on the basis of a special singularizing act that clips him, as it were, out of the communal whole. *This* solidarity implies that self-responsibility, when it is experienced, is *built upon* an experience of *coresponsibility* for the willing, acting, and effecting of the whole community. And for this reason the individual is in principle "representable" by other individuals according to law, in conformity with the firm, but nonetheless changing, structure of forms which correspond to different areas of tasks of the community, and which are called caste, class, dignity, occupation, etc., depending upon the kind of structure.

Whereas we can explain the unity of the mass, with the assistance of principles of association and their derivatives, on the basis of a common, sensible complex of stimuli, this is not possible in the case of the life-community. The life-community is a *suprasingular* unit of life and body that possesses a (formally) non-mechanical unity and lawfulness, as does any unity of this essence, whether considered objectively or subjectively, i.e., whether considered in inner or outer perception. Nevertheless,

177. The colorful and changing hypostatizations of communal subjects in history, such as units of family gods, tribal gods, and gods of common people, exist as long as religion is tied to community, i.e., to the *vital* (factual blood-communities can always be replaced by the many kinds of *symbolizations* of them).

the life-community is far from being a *personal* unit, i.e., a collective *person*. True, there is one and the same goal-determined *striving* and *counterstriving*, with a certain structure of involuntary and subconscious preferring and rejecting of values and goals of striving in the form of traditional mores, customs, cults, and costumes. But there is *no* will which can be called purposeful, which is able to choose, which is unitary and morally responsible, all of which would belong to a person. Accordingly, the life-community's *values*, i.e., both the values which it experiences as the same (especially in the natural language or its dialects) and the values of which it is the bearer, belong to the class of *thing-values* [Sachwerte], not to the class of *personal* values.

3. The social unit of the *society* is basically different from the essential social unit of the life-community.¹⁷⁸ First, the society, as opposed to the *natural* unit of the life-community, is to be defined as an *artificial* unit of individuals having *no* original "living-with-one-another" in the sense described above. Rather, *all* relations among individuals are established by *specific conscious* acts that are experienced by each as coming from his *individual* ego, which is experientially given *first in this case*, as directed to someone else as "another."

The plain experience of what goes on in the "other," or what he thinks, wills, etc., presupposes a clear *distinction* between "self-experience" and "understanding" and, consequently, between the self-experienced and the understood (with primary retention of one's own judgments), as well as the primary experienced attribution of these contents to two *different* single men. Understanding presupposes a distinction between *bodily* gestures of expression (not given *as bodily* in the life-community) and the experience in the other. It also presupposes an *analogical inference* from the self-experienced to the experienced of the other (or some logically equivalent mental process), an inference that is made on the basis of the former distinction. Moreover, common cognition, enjoyment, etc., presuppose some *criteria* of the true and the false, the beautiful and the ugly, which have been agreed upon beforehand.¹⁷⁹ Every kind of willing together and doing together presupposes the *actus* of *promising* and the

178. It is to the credit of Ferdinand Tönnies to have first established the difference between life-community and society as essential forms of human togetherness. But the above characteristics of these two social forms deviate a great deal from his; in our opinion he does not sufficiently separate a priori and historical factors.

179. All philosophy using criteria is essentially philosophy of *society*. [See "Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens."—Ed.]

phenomenon [*Sachgebilde*] of the *contract* that is constituted in mutual promising—the basic phenomenon of all private law.

From ethical and legal points of view there is no longer *any* original coresponsibility. All responsibility for others is based on unilateral *self-responsibility*, and all possible responsibility for others must be regarded as having come from a free and singular act of taking over certain obligations. There is no true solidarity (in some form of “one for all” and “all for one”)—either representable or unrepresentable¹⁸⁰—but only the similarity or dissimilarity of individuals’ *interests* and the “*classes*” resulting from such interests. As a whole, the essential social unit of society is not a special reality outside or above individuals. It is simply an indivisible fabric of *relations* that represent “conventions,”¹⁸¹ “usage,” or “contracts,” depending on whether they are more explicit or more tacit. Hence there is nothing to be found in society *in* which individuals can know themselves to possess solidarity. Just as boundless *trust* in one another is the basic attitude in the life-community, unfathomable and primary *distrust* of all in all is the basic attitude in society. If, however, the society is supposed to “will” something that is to be “common” to all of its individuals, it can do so only by *fiction* or by *force* unless it has the assistance of *other* essential social units. It is the so-called *majority* principle which functions here in constructing the fiction that the “common will” is (and must be, if things are to go on without force) the fortuitously identical volitional content of *all as individuals* (because the majority comes closest to this ideal). Force, however, consists in imposing the will of the majority on the minority.

In contrast to the life-community, which encompasses people who are *not of age* (as well as domestic animals attached to it), the society is a unit of *mature* and *self-conscious individual persons*. Whereas the personal form of unity in general does not appear in the mass or the life-community, it does appear throughout society. But it appears *exclusively* as the *individual* person who obtains in society as the person, i.e., as the individual person who is related to the value-modalities of the agreeable (society as sociability) and the useful (society as the bearer of civilization), which are relative to the sensible and are, by nature, not

180. See the following.

181. Hence conventions and mores, like fashions and costumes, must be sharply distinguished. Conventions and fashions belong entirely to society; mores and costumes, to the life-community. [See “Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens.”—*Ed.*]

unifying, but *divisive*.¹⁸² The "elements" of society, however, are not individuals in the sense of the individual spiritual person described above. The elements of society are *originaliter equal* and of *equal value* because they enter the picture as such "elements" solely by virtue of their formal character as *single persons*, not by virtue of their *non-formal* [materialen] contents of individuality. Differences in society and differences in value between its elements come about only through different values of *accomplishment* of the individuals in the value-direction of the agreeable and the useful, the value-correlates of society. To this extent there is a peculiar law that applies to the elements of society, namely, that they are formally (as single elements) entirely unrepresentable, but non-formally (as individuals) representable because they are originally *equal*. Although every individual being in a life-community is representable by another one who occupies the same position in the community (standing, office, rank, occupation), these positions themselves are not representable, nor are the individual beings insofar as they exercise functions in different positions.

However, this peculiarity of the societal structure does not preclude the possibility that the single being *as single being*, and not as an "element" of the society, perfects an awareness of his incomparable *individuality*. This occurs in a manner that is impossible in the life-community. On the level of the pure community the individualistic principle is realized only for the concrete *community*, not for the individual being. In a (pure) society it is realized *exclusively* for the *individual being*. An individual being of a life-community is *primarily* given to himself as an X, a Y, or a Z of mutual living-with-one-another or of a specific form of this. In society these X-, Y-, and Z-places are filled with an original content, so that instead of mutual living-with-one-another, there is *mediate mutual accord* concerning what is experienced by anyone "for himself." The primary seat of all moral responsibility is the *whole* of the communal reality in a life-community (the real subject of mutual living-with-one-another), and the individual being is only coresponsible for the will, actions, and doings of the whole.¹⁸³ By contrast, it is in (pure) society that

182. "Divisive" in contrast to "unifying" higher value-modalities of vital values, spiritual values, and values of the holy. It is the localizable relatedness to a lived body that accounts for their being essentially "divisive." See chap. 2, sec. 3.

183. All institutions, mores, and moralities conforming to the principle of solidary responsibility, for example, blood-revenge (within families,

the principle of the *exclusive self-responsibility* of each for his actions is realized.

Yet there are interconnections of a quite determinate character *between* society and life-community (as essential structures of social unity). The basic nexus is this: there can be *no society without life-community* (though there can be life-community without society). All *possible* society is therefore *founded* through community. This proposition holds both for the manner of "*accord*" and for the kind of formation of a *common will*. Mutual living-with-one-another and *its* content are the origins of the non-formal premises that serve in society as bases for analogical inferences establishing the "inner" life of the "other." These premises cannot be derived from any inferences.¹⁸⁴ In what concerns the obligating character of "*promising*" as the *actus* of formation of the will and as the ideal ought-to-be of "*promising*" in the sense of *what* has been promised, the (former) duty does *not* have its source in *other* acts of promising (e.g., in the promise to keep one's promise), but solely in the moral *faithfulness* whose roots are in the norm according to which original willing-with-one-another cannot be changed without an additional and sufficient reason of value. For the ought-to-be of what has been promised and of what has been accepted as such by the one who has been promised something has its foundation in the ought-to-be of this content as something *identical* for a willing-with-one-another. And the duty to keep mutual promises that are in a contract, the basic form of the formation of a uniform will in society, does *not* have its source in *another* contract to keep contracts. It has its source in the *solidary* obligation of the members of the community to realize the contents that ought to be for the members. A so-called contract *without* this foundation would be nothing but a fiction. It would be only the expression and statement of a momentary, hypothetical volitional readiness to do something on the condition that the other do something, while the other expresses this momentary and hypothetical readiness. But the content of the *genuine contract* (as something to be realized in the future) is *plainly* willed by the contractual partners, and not in terms of this merely hypothetical volitional readiness. And the hypothetical obligation of A to do something

tribes, and clans), belong to the predominantly communal ethos. The community itself is responsible, while every one of its members remains coresponsible to the degree of his importance within the community.

184. See *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle*, p. 144. [See *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pt. C, chap. 3.—Ed.]

when *B* does something belongs to the mutually willed *content* of the contract, not to the will of one of the partners.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, what is mutually *willed* in the contract is plainly given as something to be realized (and thus it is not given as present or future); only the *execution* lies in the sphere of the future within specified dates. Just as the contractual principle has its *roots* in the principle of solidarity, so also conventions and artificial terminologies that support the societal form of *mutual cognition* have their *roots* in the *natural language*, where they can be established in the first place, and on whose *categories* of meaning they remain dependent.¹⁸⁶

To say that all societal unity (in all walks of life, religion, art, knowledge, commerce) has its foundation in the unity of the life-community is not to imply that the *same* groups of real individuals bound together in a society must also (in another direction) form a community. This law of foundations obtains only for the two *essential structures* of social unification. However, in its application to *factual* relations, this law means two things. First, individuals who enter into societal relations must at some time have gone through a union of the structure of the community in order to be able to enter into the forms of mutual accord and volitional formation that characterize the societal unit. For *A* to be able to make a contract with *B*, it is not necessary for *A* to be communally related to *B*; but he must have been so related to *C*, *D*, or *E* at some time (e.g., in terms of the family in which he grew up) in order to be able to understand the sense of "contract." Second, all societal combinations of individuals *A*, *B*, and *C* or groups *G*, *G*₁, and *G*₂ can occur *only* when *A*, *B*, and *C* or *G*, *G*₁, and *G*₂ simultaneously belong to another totality *G*₃ of a community—one which is not necessarily formed by *A*, *B*, and *C* or *G*, *G*₁, and *G*₂, but which nevertheless contains them as members. Thus the individuals of all families of *one* lineage [*Stammes*] form a community vis-à-vis the individuals of all families of another lineage; within the lineage they form a community

185. Naturally, willing with reservation is to be clearly distinguished from the willing of reservations.

186. There is an analogous relation between natural symbols and artificial allegory, between artistic willing and works of art in a community and in a society, between a traditional, communal, religious content of faith and religious education, etc. But the *criteria* which must be presupposed in collective cognition in a society if an understanding of the sameness of something is to be possible must themselves be seen by all in terms of *συμφιλοσοφειν*. Otherwise an infinite series of criteria would be necessary to establish the sameness of a proposition as a criterion. [See "Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens."—*Ed.*]

only as members of their families, and among themselves they form only a society. Thus all nations belonging to the cultural circle "Europe" form a community in relation to all nations of the Asian cultural circle. The members of each cultural circle are co-responsible for the well-being of the whole of the circle; but within Europe and among themselves the same nations form only a society. In this case and analogous ones our proposition implies that the character of obligation and the sanction of the contracts into which individuals or groups enter always presuppose a *further* communal whole to which they simultaneously belong, and that this sanction stems from the unitary collective will of this whole. The idea of the contract thus does not presuppose the unit of the *state*¹⁸⁷—as some have erroneously maintained in criticism of the contract theory—but a *further* community to which the partners to the contract belong.

4. From the essential types of social unity thus far mentioned, namely, mass, society, and life-community, we must distinguish the highest essential type of social unity, with whose characteristics we began this chapter: *the unity of independent, spiritual, and individual single persons "in" an independent, spiritual, and individual collective person*. We assert that this unity, and it alone, is the *nucleus* and total *novelty* of the true and ancient Christian idea of community, and that this Christian idea represents, so to speak, the historical discovery of this unity. In quite a peculiar manner, this idea of community unites the being and indestructible self-value of the individual "soul" (conceived in terms of creation) and the person (contrary to the ancient theory of corporation and the Jewish idea of "people") by means of the idea of the salvational solidarity of all in the *corpus christianum*, which is founded on the Christian idea of love (and which is contrary to the mere ethos of "society," which denies moral solidarity).

For on this level any finite person is an individual person *and* at the same time a member of a collective person. It simply belongs to the essence of a finite person (fully known as such) both to *be* so and to *experience* himself so. Thus responsibility-for (someone) and responsibility-to (someone) are *essentially* different in orientation. In the life-community the bearer of *all* responsibility is the reality of the community, and the individual is co-responsible for the life-community; in the collective person every individual *and* the collective person are *self*-responsible

187. The idea of a contract *between* states is for this reason precluded.

(= responsible for oneself), and at the same time every individual is also coresponsible for the collective person (and for every individual "in" it), just as the collective person is coresponsible for *each* of its members. Hence coresponsibility between the individual person and the collective person is *mutual* and does not preclude self-responsibility on the part of both. As for the responsibility-to (someone), it must be said that there is *neither* an ultimate responsibility of the individual to the collective person, as is the case in the life-community, *nor* an ultimate responsibility of the collective person to the individual (or to the sum or a majority of individuals), as is the case in the society (principle of the majority). Nevertheless, *both* the collective person and the individual person are responsible to the person of persons, to *God*, and, indeed, in terms of self-responsibility *as well as* coresponsibility. But here the principle of solidarity, which diminishes and disappears in a pure society but obtains *exclusively* in the life-community, takes on a new sense. It changes from a principle of *representable* solidarity into one of *unrepresentable solidarity*: the individual person is coresponsible for all other individual persons "in" the collective person not only as the representative of an *office*, a *rank*, or any other positional value in the social structure, but also, indeed, *first of all*, as a *unique personal individual* and as the bearer of an individual conscience in the sense defined above. In moral self-examination at this level, not only must everyone ask, What of positive moral value would have occurred in the world and what of negative moral value would have been avoided if I, as a *representative of a place* in the social structure, had comported myself differently? But everyone must also ask, What would have occurred if I, as a *spiritual individual*, had *grasped*, willed, and realized the "*good-in-itself-for-me*" (in the sense described before) in a *superior* manner? The principle of solidarity is thus not *precluded* by the proposition that there is, in addition to the universally valid good-in-itself, an individually valid good-in-itself. On the contrary, this proposition raises the principle to the *highest* level that it can possibly attain.

Hence in *this* sense the principle of solidarity is for us an eternal component and a *fundamental article of the cosmos of finite moral persons*. The *total* moral world—no matter how far its sphere may extend in space and time, here on earth or on discovered and undiscovered planets or even beyond these—becomes *one encompassing whole* through the validity of this principle. This whole *rises and falls as a whole* whenever this princi-

ple suffers the slightest change, and as a *whole* it possesses at every moment of its existence a *unique* moral *totality-value* (a total evil and total good, a total guilt and total merit) that can *never* be regarded as the *sum* of individuals' evil and good or as the sum of their guilt and merit. But *every* person, both the individual person and the collective person, participates in this according to his special and *unique* membership. Suppose that we find ourselves in a world court. No one *alone* would be tried by its highest judge; all would have to answer to him in the unity of *one* act, and all taken together would have to listen to this judge in *one* act. He would not sentence anyone until he had heard, understood, and valued *all* others *with* this one. In *each* he would cosentence the *whole* no less than the whole in each.

What are the essential elements on which this great and sublime principle rests?¹⁸⁸ Ultimately it rests on two propositions. The first is a proposition that we stressed before, namely, that a community of persons belongs to the evidential *essence* of a possible person—regardless of the real and, by essential necessity, fortuitous causes of the *empirically real connections* between certain persons and certain others—and that the possible unities of sense and of value of such a community possess an a priori structure independent in principle of the kind, measure, place, and time of the realization of these unities. This is the *foundation* that makes moral solidarity *possible*. What makes moral solidarity *necessary* is the formal proposition concerning the (direct or indirect)¹⁸⁹ *essential reciprocity and reciprocal valueness* of all morally relevant comportment and the corresponding non-formal propositions concerning the essential nexus of the basic *types* of social acts. This reciprocity is *not* based on the contingent reality of these acts, on specific persons who execute these acts, or on the presence of real mechanisms and factual forms of conveyance in which this reciprocity gains *reality*. It

188. See *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle*, pp. 65 ff., and "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen," pp. 217, 241-74. Since I do not wish to repeat myself, I must ask the reader to consult these passages. [See *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pt. B, chap. 2. See also "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen," sec. 5, and "Über Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil," sec. 4.—*Ed.*]

189. By virtue of the co-originality of individual and collective persons in the nature of the uniform finite person, the individual acts mentioned earlier (self-love, self-perfection, self-happiness, etc.) "indirectly" possess this essential reciprocity and reciprocal valueness, and all social acts "indirectly" possess an essential relation to self-sanctification and self-ruin (in the end)—without any *intention toward* community or one's own self in either case.

rests on the ideal *unity of sense* of these acts as acts of the *essence* of love, esteem, promising, giving orders, etc., acts that require as ideal correlates responses of love, esteem, accepting, obeying, etc., in order to bring about a fact of uniform sense. These and analogous propositions *cannot* be established by inductive methods for two reasons: first, because they are presupposed by every possible understanding of these acts (including every inductive investigation of their factual occurrence); and, second, because they could not in the least be as well founded inductively as inductive propositions are required to be. The possible understanding of a love—for instance, of an act of kindness to me—at least implies coexperiencing the *requirement* of a response of love which belongs to the nature of this act and which is realized psychically (be it in terms of an actual response or a real tendency toward its execution which is disturbed by other motives, or in terms of a merely emotionally represented response of love).¹⁹⁰ It is, I say, the mere *understanding* of this act that implies this. One who does not see this does not look with precision at the *experience*. However I may deny esteem to him who esteems me and whose esteem I understand, however I may refuse any response of love to a felt love, or obedience to an understood command, or acceptance of a promise, I must somehow “*deny*” this to him and “*refuse*” this. I cannot on the one hand understand the sense of his intention and on the other comport myself as if nothing had happened. Of course it may be that the responding act of love and esteem, based on the experienced demand for an act of response, remains a mere act-*stimulus* or, if executed, hits an empty spot, so to speak, in which no *value* of the other person is given that would *correspond* to this act of response. I am then not “able” to esteem and love the other despite *his* esteem and love. But in this case this tendency or this inability or the non-fulfillment of this responding intention in the value of the other is experienced as something positive. Of course this does not in the least mean that in love and esteem there is an *intention* toward a response of love or esteem, or any conditional act with a reservation such as “I will esteem and love you *if* you love and esteem me.” For precisely this is *evidentially* precluded by *true* love and esteem of the person. And even the sight of such an intention *destroys* the *experience* of

190. We have discussed so-called emotive representations earlier. [See above, pp. 331, 332, n. 114. See also “Idole,” chap. 4 (in *Vom Umsturz der Werte* [Bibliog. no. 31], p. 266).—Ed.]

the demand for response in love and esteem. The demand for the response to love lies in the *sense* of love as love, *not* in subjective intentions and desires (which may accompany love in X or Y); and in the mere understanding of this sense of love one finds the stimulus of the act of response to love, without which not even the experiential *material* for such understanding would be given. This holds analogously for correlative negative acts of hate and disrespect, when they occur. This *fact alone* grounds the coresponsibility of every (otherwise variable) bearer of these acts for the moral values and disvalues of the acts of the (otherwise variable) bearers of responding acts. One who loves not only realizes a positive act-value in himself but also realizes, *ceteris paribus*, such a value in the beloved. Responding love, as love, also bears the positive act-value of love.¹⁹¹ He who refuses an act of love of ideal oughtness, which is to correspond to the other's *worthiness* to be loved, possesses *coresponsibility* for the negative value lying in the non-being of the positive value of responding love.¹⁹² He does not simply possess self-responsibility for having refused this act. In addition to this there is another proposition, also stressed before, which confers upon the principle of solidarity the *complete* fullness of its *extension*. Because the spiritual person, as the concrete act-center of all his executions of acts, is related to his acts, not as an unalterable substance to its changing properties or activities or as a collective whole to its members or as a whole to its aggregate parts, but as the concrete to the abstract,¹⁹³ and because the whole person is and lives in *each* act without exhausting himself in one act or the sum of these acts, there is no act whose execution does not change the content of the person's *being*, and no act-value that does not increase or decrease, enhance or diminish, or positively or negatively determine the value of the person. In every moral individual act of positive value the ability for acts of the kind concerned increases; in other words, there is an increase in what we designated as the *virtue* of the person (which is very different from the habituation and practice of *actions* related to the virtue in question), that is, the experienced power to realize the good that ought to be. Thus mediated, every moral act effects changes in the being and value of the person himself. In relation to our question, this

191. Even though this act, as a reactive act, would not be equal in height to the spontaneous act. See above, p. 101.

192. See the formal axioms given above, on p. 26 f.

193. See chap. 6, A, sec. 3.

means that it is *not* by virtue of *fortuitous* causes or circumstances but by virtue of the *essence* of the state of affairs concerned that the virtue-value implicit in B's act of love in response to A, or the increase in personal value, obtains not only for A but also for *any other persons C, D, E, . . . X* and can become fruitful for them. This also means that A possesses original coresponsibility for the presence or absence of *this*, quite apart from the fortuitous causes that lead *C, D, E, . . . X* to meet in space and time. One who has become more lovable in responding to love with love, or one who has become more filled with hate in responding to hate with hate, will become so, *ceteris paribus*, for all *possible* "others," not according to rules of experiential association, but according to essential laws.¹⁹⁴

If one takes a look at the *relation* of this idea of the highest form of social unity—as the idea of a solidary realm of love of individual, independent spiritual persons in a plurality of collective persons of the same character (this unity of collective persons among themselves, as well as the unity of the individual person and the collective person, is possible in God alone)—to the ideas of *life-community* and *society*, one can see that *life-community* and *society* as essential forms of social unity are *subordinated* to this highest essential social form, and that they are determined to serve it and to make it appear, but, to be sure, in different manners. Although the idea of the highest form of

194. In *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle*, I also showed that neither spiritual acts of love nor the genuine *kinds* of love are genetic products of drive-impulses or empirically contingent feeling-states, and, furthermore, that drive-impulses have only a *selective* significance for the contingent real objects that become the factual object of love or the type of love concerned. Accordingly, I showed, too, that real history, in which there occurs a gradual enlargement and extension of the domain of objects of love and its types (family, tribe, people, nation, etc.), only "fulfills" original intentional goals, which do not grow out of real history itself. As to the first of these two points, it follows, concerning the principle of solidarity, that not only the act of hate (*bad in itself*) but also the *absence* of the act of love determines coresponsibility for all evil deeds and for all that happens—and this *prior* to any empirical demonstration of even the possibility of a factual and indirect cooperation in the realization of evil. Yet these principles are maxims that obligate us always to *find out* the evil that would not have happened in the world had *we* only comported ourselves differently. The second point has this consequence for the principle of solidarity: that its sense and validity are not somehow *produced* by history or by changes in communities in factual contact with each other, that this sense is, in part, *fulfilled* only in history, and that this principle itself is a *moral a priori* of *all possible history and all possible community*. [See *ibid.*, pt. B, chap. 6.—Ed.]

social unity is not a "synthesis" of life-community and society, essential characteristics of *both* are nevertheless cogiven in it: the independent, individual person, as in society; and solidarity and real collective unity, as in community. If one asks what the societal form and the communal form mean and achieve in terms of the establishment of the highest moral ideal, one can do justice to *both forms* only by refusing to measure one against the other as its supposed superior. One must measure both society and life-community against this uniquely factual *highest* form. The philosophical, ethical, and sociological currents that have dominated the past two centuries show the errors to which the first of these alternatives leads. From the viewpoint of society as the highest unitary person, the *life-community* (with its ethos) appears only as a more *primitive* developmental form of society, not as an *enduring* essential type of human association in which essential values of specific ranks are represented, indeed, the only place in which they *can* be represented. This alternative dominated almost all philosophy of the eighteenth century; Kant, as well as positivists like Hume, Comte, and Spencer, adopted this view more or less consciously. The peculiar nature of community as an *essential kind* of social unity is not grasped at all here. In order to explain the origin (i.e., the *form* of the genesis, not the positive historical genesis) of all social structures of the spirit (the state, economic corporations, the church, law, mores, myth, language, etc.), it is necessary to return to the idea of a contract that is consciously concluded, or, in the case of Hume, for example, to a contract that is automatically established; and in order to have a *standard* by which to assess the legal order and the degree of development of any extant social structure, one is forced to suppose that it is "as if" its origin were contractual.¹⁹⁵

195. In the appendix to *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle*, I showed how the structure of these ideas is, in the final analysis, also borne by the theory of a pointlike soul-substance (like an atom) of the individual person—a theory so characteristic of this type of philosophy—as well as by the theory of analogical inferences as the basis of the positing of other persons. Other *consequences* stemming from these false principles include the theory of exclusive self-responsibility in ethics, the disintegration of the idea of the church as a form of a (historical or simultaneous) *solidary* path to God in favor of a basic relatedness of "every soul to its God," the ideal of an "eternal peace" on the basis of contracts among states (the ethos of peace is predominantly societal, that of war predominantly communal), the educationally one-sided intellectualization of the individual through "enlightenment," the economic system of free competition, and many other factors. [See *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pt. C, chap. 3.—Ed.]

If, on the other hand, one takes the life-community's form of human association, with *its* ethos, to be the "highest" as well as the basic form—as is done in various ways in the doctrines of the old and the new romanticisms (the "historical" schools of the sciences of the spirit)—*society*, like life-community in the case above, no longer appears to be an *enduring* essential form of possible social unity in which, and in which alone, essential values of a specific rank can be and are represented. Here society appears to be a *phenomenon of dissolution*, i.e., a merely *historical* phase of the life-community. If this presupposition were true, this *would* in fact be the form of societal existence and its ethos. Here there is an exact *analogy* with the value-relation among the vital-organic good, the mechanical-instrumental good, and the cultural good (ultimately the good of salvation) that I have demonstrated elsewhere.¹⁹⁶ Measured against the vital-organic good (which cannot be reduced to the instrumental good, just as life cannot be reduced to mechanisms), the instrumental good appears to be a miserable surrogate and at the same time the consequence of a *fixation* of vital development or of the subordination of values of development to values of preservation—and so an *evil*. But in relation to the cultural good, the instrumental good as the means of release and liberation of the spirit and the individual person to their immanent goal-directions is a good of *positive* value. From the point of view of the life-community and its ethos, society is analogously a mere phenomenon of *dissolution* of negative value, although society represents an *essential basis* for a possible spiritual community of persons in a collective personality and an unavoidable essential condition for the latter. And for this reason it represents a *positive* social essential value. Hence the romanticism and the rationalism (as well as the "liberalism") of the eighteenth century are *equally* wrong. Their errors have two principal components in *common*: first, disregard for the *highest* form of possible social unity and therewith disregard for the ultimately subordinated and mediating nature of *all* other social forms vis-à-vis this highest form; second, and following from this, the erroneous opinion that life-community and society are historically contingent stages of development which differ from one another only *in degree*, and that they are not *essentially* different, *necessary*, and *lasting*

196. See my essay, "Zur Idee des Menschen" (Bibliog. no. 10). My treatment of the same point in my essay, "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen," in the chapter entitled "Organ und Werkzeug," was one-sided because I did not consider cultural goods.

forms of *all* possible association which are to be differentiated as elements in *every* kind of real, concrete social unity.¹⁹⁷

But in fact all historical development possesses strict *limits* set by these essentialities of social unity and their essential relations. This "development" does not give birth to them but occurs *according to them* and within their *framework*. What is historically variable is simply the special *content* of mass, life-community, society, and collective person; the ties that these forms have with factual groups and their changing magnitudes, their properties, their human material, and the specially dominant ideas about them; and the passage of positive historical structures, e.g., Christianity, the European economy, *through* these forms. *But these essential units themselves correspond to the idea of the social unity of a sensible-bodily-spiritual being in general*, of which the factual nature of *man* is only a "special case." There was no real development of any sort *from* one form *to* another, as if man entered first the form of the mass or the herd, *then* the form of the community, and finally the personal-communal form.¹⁹⁸ On the contrary, at all places and at all times *all* of these forms and their corresponding ethoses have in some measure been present in various *mixtures*. The only law that can be maintained here with regard, not to the succession itself, but to the *order* of the stages of their succession is that a positively determined historical totality, *ceteris paribus*, shows the tendency to pass through these forms in the following direction: *predominantly* mass (or herd) existence, vital-communal existence, societal existence, and personal-communal existence. Analogously, every concretely historical *moral tenor* of a group would manifest itself as a *mixture* of the ideally typical forms of mass comportment, which is without ethos and responsibility, and the *ethos* of life-community, the ethos of society, and the ethos of the community of persons. That is, a special bearing toward goods of the values of well-being and the noble (the positive values of the life-community), goods of the agreeable and the useful (the positive values of society as sociability and civilized society), and goods of spiritual values and the holy (the positive values of the community of persons in its two basic forms, the cultural community and the religious community) was present *at all places and at all times* in some measure and in some order.

197. The intersubjective form of the mass is also in some measure in *all* factual social units.

198. As, for example, the sociology of Spencer would have us believe. He does not consider the last of our social forms at all.

The only changes occur in the real subjects of this bearing, the sizes of the groups that fulfill these communal forms, the world of *goods* in which these types of *values* are represented, the organizations of communal groups, etc.

If the forms of life-community and society are ultimately in the service of the spiritual community of persons, the same also holds for the variety of ethoses of these forms, which Herbert Spencer designated as either predominantly *warlike* (status) or predominantly *peaceful* (contract). On the basis of *his* assumptions the former would have to *disappear* in the face of the latter. According to our view the direction of *development* from status (community) to contract (society), which Spencer assumes, does *not* exist, because both forms (i.e., in their service to the third one) are equally essential factors in any factual social classification of mankind. We must expect for *all* times a peculiar admixture of these two forms of human ethos and a rhythmic alteration of the states of war and peace in which they express themselves most often and most purely.

What alone is true in Spencer's construction is that the ethos of *Western Europe in modern times*, in comparison with the ethos of the Middle Ages and the ethoses of other modern cultures, has been *predominantly societal* in all special value-regions (religion, state, commerce, etc.). But it is equally certain that there are visible hints that the *principle of solidarity*, which conflicts with this ethos, will win *new reality* in both experience and theory on the grounds which prepared the way for this predominantly societal period and in the relations among individual persons within the collective person and in the relations among collective persons within a collective person encompassing them.¹⁹⁹ This is not the place to pursue these clues empirically. We will simply say that to expect a simple return from the new ethos to the predominance of the ethos of the life-community is, in our view, an error as basic as Spencer's. I have shown that the representation of *one* moral total ideal anchored in the objective order of values not only *allows* different forms of ethos but also *requires* them, and that these different forms must express themselves both in the dimension of simultaneity (as diverse types of ethos among peoples, nations, cultural units) and in the dimension of succession (as diverse forms of ethos of the so-called spirit of the times). In this case we may assume that one should not

199. On the labor movement, see Eduard Bernstein, "Die moderne Arbeiterbewegung," in *Die Gesellschaft*. A proof of this proposition in relation to the factual tendencies of our era belongs to another context.

regard a societal ethos prevailing within Western Europe in modern times as a segment of a curve which one could extend (in Spencerian fashion), according to an inherent orientation, to all humanity, but that one must regard such an ethos as a special *direction of preferring* which lasted for a time in the development of one (relatively small) part of humanity, as opposed to the rest of humanity and other historical periods in which the ethos of the life-community is predominant. Appearances of such directions reveal a world-historical division in all of man's moral work, the final result of which will be something unique, something greater than mortal eyes have ever seen.²⁰⁰

We have sharply distinguished the reality of a community in general from that of the collective person. But what are the most general *characteristics* that distinguish a collective *person* from the other kinds of *non-personal* communal reality? These are characteristics which make a collective person primarily a unity of a *spiritual* act-center—not primarily a unity of place (territory), time (tradition), or descent (blood), or a unity of a collective *purpose*, which always presupposes the existence of such an act-center with its special values and special ends, and which does not determine any collective *reality* at all. Second, a collective *person* must be directed toward goods of *all* modal types of values, not only toward goods of only *one* type among them, and it must be directed toward these modalities in accordance with the order of its individuality. Hence the collective *person* must possess this autonomy of being and superiority of will with respect to all other particular social units directed toward only one value-modality, i.e., both the society and the life-community. And this we call its *sovereignty*. Only insofar as the collective person is sovereign in this sense is it a genuine person with a peculiar *total world of values* with its own peculiar gradations. But this sovereignty of the collective person does not at all imply that the collective person is responsible “only to God,” nor does it imply that the characteristics of free and autonomous existence and volitional determination implicit in its sovereignty with regard to particular social units also belong to all other genuine collective persons. Rather, the collective person is always *co-responsible* for these other collective persons because it is in each case *also* a member of a collective person encompassing several collective persons. The collective person does not even

200. [See “Der Mensch im Weltalter des Ausgleichs” (Bibliog. nos. 26, 27).—*Ed.*]

have sovereignty (apart from particular social units) with regard to collective persons of one and the same group of membership, for whom it is co-responsible. Still less does it have sovereignty with respect to the collective persons encompassing it, for which it is co-responsible and *before* which it is, in addition, responsible.²⁰¹ Whether it can be called into account before a *court of law* does not matter, because legal and a fortiori moral responsibility is not dependent upon the existence of such a court.

If the collective person is sovereign to this extent, and *only* to this extent, then it is always sovereign *over* one or more *life-communities* and one or more *societal* units. The life-community is in principle related to the collective person as the lived body is related to the individual person. The life-community can therefore be called the *collective lived body* of the collective person. But we never reach the individual by attempting to reach a simple unit of the lived body of a collective person, no matter how it is to be divided.²⁰² The individual and all units of groups of individuals are always *members* of *society*, which, above all, lacks the characteristic of a total reality. Society is always subordinated to the collective person, not in an immediate and direct way, but only through the *mediation* of the life-communities (and their special organizations) to which the elements of society belong. Societal "purposes" and "interests" are subordinated to the growth and well-being and the values of development and preservation of the life-communities to which societal elements belong, and are thus subordinated *independent* of the collective person. The task of the collective person begins only when the values of growth and well-being of the specific life-communities subordinated to the collective person are to be balanced in the idea of collective growth and well-being (of "its" lived body).²⁰³

Among the essential characteristics of the collective person,

201. It was Jean Bodin who first formulated the concept of sovereignty that is opposed to ours. His concept, applied to the state, implies responsibility on the part of a "sovereign subject" "only before God" (in Bismarck's words, "We Germans fear God and nothing else in this world"), or it even denies responsibility on the part of the sovereign because he is the "creator" of what is good, evil, holy, unholy, etc. (Thomas Hobbes). Hobbes later carried Bodin's concept to extremes. It can be easily seen in this context that Bodin's concept is only an application of an exclusively societal ethos to a collective person (the state).

202. Whether the family or marriage is this elementary unit does not have to be decided here.

203. This could serve as a basis for a general principle of *self-administration* for life-communities over social conflicts of interest within their territories. We will not deal with this point in detail here.

which is itself a concrete and spiritual act-center, we have found that it must possess both the goods of *all* value-modalities and the factual social units of *all* essential forms. But this does not mean that there is only *one* kind of collective person; it means, rather, that *supravital* values belong only to the collective person, i.e., neither to society nor to the life-community, that the collective person is directed in some way toward all types of values, and that it must possess a peculiar *consciousness* of them and have *consideration* for them. But here it is not yet decided which values are to be realized in *preference* to others in a certain kind of collective person. This last point provides the basis for another possible *essential differentiation* within the idea of the collective person.

One cannot simply base this differentiation on one of the spiritual values, namely, *right*, because a just order exists and should exist for *all* external actions and all distributions of goods, no matter to which class of non-formal values they may belong. Hence *all* collective persons can in principle become establishers and administrators of a positive order of laws, which, in order to be just, must satisfy all essential propositions that found possible law.²⁰⁴

Among the spiritual culture values, we have already distinguished the special divisions of *collective* values and the value of the holy as *collective* salvation. *Two* types of collective persons correspond to these basic values that must be realized: to the former, the *cultural collective person*, which de facto can be a *nation* or a *cultural unit*; and to the latter, the collective person of the *church*. Only these two types of collective persons can be called *purely* spiritual collective persons.

The *state* may not be called this. It is not a concrete and perfect person, because it does not perform *all* acts of an essentially spiritual nature, despite its total reality of a *spiritual* nature. The state, as seen by itself, is simply the highest center of the spiritual collective *will*, i.e., the will of *control* over a natural life-community (people) or a plurality of such communities. The values toward which the controlling will is directed are implicit in: (1) the establishment and realization of a positive *order of laws* for life-communities subordinated to it (legislation and jurisprudence); (2) the furtherance, regulation, and guidance of the natural extensive and intensive *growth* of the life-com-

204. It is a mere *partisan* principle of no philosophical or historical importance that the state is the *sole* source of positive law, and that the state *bestows* all right of legislation through corporations, churches, etc.

munities and the production of vital goods for the communities which it governs (realization of the "values of development") i.e., extensive growth through a military organization, intensive growth first through qualitative and quantitative policies for population and health; (3) the preservation and furtherance of the *well-being* of the whole of the community, both within and without (administration, "defense" of the community against attacks).²⁰⁵

Among the kinds of values to which these three kinds of goods can be reduced, only the values of *right* are of a *purely* spiritual nature. The other two kinds of values, the values of *power* and *well-being*, are vital in nature. The state remains a *spiritual* subject-of-will having value *in itself* in regulating the realization of the goods corresponding to the values of power and well-being. But the *ethos* by which the state fulfills all its basic tasks does not stem originally from the state itself. It stems from the spiritual collective persons behind and, as it were, *above* the state, i.e., immediately from the cultural personality of the *nation* or the cultural circle which stands behind it and to which it belongs, and mediately from the collective person of the religio-ecclesiastical unity. Only when nation and state coincide, the nation giving the state its essential unity and limits (and not vice versa, as in the so-called state-nation), does the idea of a perfectly spiritual collective person arise²⁰⁶—the idea of the national state, which, although it is nowhere fully realized and is not drawn from experience, nevertheless remains a *standard* for everything present in this direction.

The *people*, in contrast to the nation, are primarily or predominantly a real *life-community*. And the *state*, in relation to the people, is, as a *spiritual* collective reality, a form surpassing them in value. Hence the state is by no means an "organized

205. The positive task of the realization of "culture" cannot be attributed to the state, and this according to the essence of the state. What the state has to accomplish for schools and lower and higher education as organized by the state can be assigned in part to legislation for *all* institutions of activities of the state's communities and in part to the task of the preservation and enhancement of the general well-being. As to spiritual culture, in the strict sense the state has the merely *negative* function of sustaining the conditions of the possibility of culture and protecting itself from within and without against forces *hostile* to culture. The *creative* forces of culture reside with the nation and the individual, not with the state.

206. I call this personal unit perfect, as opposed to the state, which is not a subject of culture, and the nation, which in itself is not a subject of a real collective *will*.

people" (Paulsen), but the highest real organizing will of control over a people or a plurality of peoples.²⁰⁷ In a certain sense, therefore, the state is, in the ranks of values, *above* the people²⁰⁸ but *below* the nation:²⁰⁹ in the former case, as a spiritual structure; in the latter, as the mere unity of a will of control. In summary we may say that the state is a personlike, real, spiritual total subject with sovereign control over the life-community, but that it is neither a "perfectly" spiritual collective person nor a "purely" spiritual collective person. The state, like the merely cultural collective person (as opposed to the national state), is an "imperfect" person, and it is also a personlike reality in which the spiritual and the vital are mixed.

The *church* is distinguished from the *state* because it is related first of all to the realization of another basic value, namely, that of collective *salvation*, and because it is related to all other values only insofar as the realization of these values *conditions* the realization of collective salvation (according to the church's variable positive contents of faith and doctrine). Man partakes in this *collective salvation* of a realm of love of *all* finite persons (this salvation being distinguished from the salvation of all), not primarily as a member of a life-community (family, tribe, people, etc.) or as an element of society, but as a *purely spiritual individual person*, who can be a single *and* a collective person. "Leave your father and mother and follow me" is the advice here; and, I add, leave your home, people, fatherland, state, nation, and cultural circle, if necessary, for the collective salvation of the world of finite persons. The immediate substrate for the church as an essential idea is therefore not mankind as divided into life-communities (families, tribes, peoples), societies, states, or cultural units; still less is it mankind as a real species in nature. It is the *realm of finite persons*, which can be greater or smaller than this species (a fortiori its known part), for it also

207. The fact that the term *people* is used to designate the uneducated and lower classes ("a man of the people," "people's art," etc.), and also in the sense of "the Bavarian people," is *not* a matter of pure chance. A unit of people in the last sense, in contrast to a national unit, which rests, above all, on the *minority of the educated*, is determined essentially by the unit in the first sense, also.

208. *Nationality* pertains to a predominant community of *natural* language which does *not* yet condition a specific cultural unit or represent a predominant life-community, as the people do. This is in contrast to the *nation*, which has its unity in a specific cultural idea.

209. For this reason, only the nation has the *moral* right to change the constitution of the state beyond those changes provided for in the constitution, i.e., the moral right to revolution.

includes the *deceased*, if immortality is assumed, as well as finite personal beings unknown to us, but only *insofar* as it encompasses their *personal* form of existence, or insofar as we may assume with good reason that it *can* do so. If it belongs to the nature of a cultural person to produce *collective works of the spirit* in accordance with its specific inner cultural temperament, and if it belongs to the nature of the state to *rule* in accordance with the ethos of the cultural unit to which it belongs, it belongs to the nature of the church to serve: *to serve the solidary collective unity of all finite persons*. The church may develop structures of control *within itself*, but the whole of such a structure will serve the end of total salvation. And the state may develop structures of service, but, again, the whole will possess the sense of *ruling*. The church also performs its service in checking on the moral tenors, wills, and deeds of both individual and collective persons, so that *nothing happens* which is contrary to the collective salvation of the person-totality. On the other hand, in determining *what* (positively) is supposed to be and what is supposed to happen, *only* individual persons as members of the realm of persons (and not as persons as such) are subject to the church's norms, not collective persons. Hence collective persons determine, according to their own immanent *ethoses*, what should happen in their own spheres. Since the *pure* state possesses *no* ethos of its own, as we have shown, but receives the ethos that it is obliged to follow from the collective person standing behind it, the essential relationship between church and state is such that the church does not control the state directly, but controls it *through* checking on the ethos of the cultural unit to which the state belongs. In what concerns the ethos,²¹⁰ the church, according to its nature, exercises direct control *exclusively* over the ethos of purely cultural persons.

The basic relationship between the church and the life-community and society is completely different. The life-community by nature has *no* ethos. It has only *mores* and *customs*. If these mores and customs touch upon the conditions of collective salvation by autonomous decree of the church, they are subject to a *direct* action of the church (through positive legislation, jurisdiction) that is not necessarily mediated by the state. Likewise, those forms and values of forms inherent in a life-community which, by virtue of their structure and inner constitution, *necessarily* touch upon the conditions of salvation are sub-

210. In the sense defined above. See chap. 5, sec. 6.

ject to *direct* ecclesiastical regulation, though the state's simultaneous regulation of these matters (mores, customs, and certain forms of the life-community) is not thereby precluded but demanded.²¹¹ Forms of the life-community of this type are, above all, *marriage, family, and the home-community*. These require regulation *as such* and as forms of the development and formation of men toward possible mature persons, i.e., as the primary factors in education and instruction, insofar as these touch upon the values of salvation. However, in contrast to its relation with the life-community, the church exercises *no* influence on *society*. The social form of unity of *society* is subject both to the will of control of the *state* through the life-communities to which society's elements belong and to the *ethos* of these cultural units through the cultural units to which society's elements belong, insofar as nothing in society must be or happen contrary to this will and this ethos. Apart from this, society and its goods follow their *own* laws (for example, private law, classes, economic exchange, technological development, etc.), and within these two restrictions society pervades *all* life-communities, units of culture, and states as an international, intercultural, interstate, and inter-peoples social structure. The church has no direct relation to it; it can have significance for society only through the mediate exercising of direct and indirect forms of influence on the life-community and the units of the state and the culture.²¹²

There is another, basically different relationship between the church and the spiritual collective persons of *cultural units*. First, the cultural domains (art, philosophy, pure science, etc.), which are divided on the basis of the divisions of spiritual values, follow their own special and universally valid laws of values (and the norms derived from them). Second, they follow the special, *individually valid* value-ideal of the cultural person concerned. This person's universally valid and, for the cultural person in question, individual form of *growth* and *decline* possesses its *own* types of *laws* which are pertinent to the essences of these

211. A positive act of abstention concerning this regulation can occur, be it on the part of the state or on the part of the church, for the benefit of the other party. But this is *positive act*.

212. Every ecclesiastical-religious ethos always contains a fixed "economic tenor." See "Der Bourgeois und die religiösen Mächte" (Bibliog. no. 10). But this economic tenor can become effective in societal development in only the indicated indirect manner. Direct involvement of a church in societal processes—for instance, ecclesiastical *legal norm-giving* for economic life, or bringing together economic interests and ecclesiastical ones—is contrary to the nature of the *two* value-areas concerned.

cultural areas vis-à-vis the analogous forms of *progression* and *retrogression* possessed by civilizational values directed toward society (and which obtain interpersonally for cultural persons).²¹³ Cultural domains do not require any so-called completion by some religious reality. The act-essences that construct them do not require any "completion" by a form of religious consciousness, either. Nor do these domains by themselves lead in a conclusive way toward the positing of some religious idea of value and its act-correlate. For neither religious values in general nor religious collective values, as they determine the ecclesiastical consciousness, "stem" from cultural values or cultural collective values or from a "synthesis" of these; nor is the source of religious experience the undifferentiated unity of the source of that world experience which is at the bottom of all cultural production. Rather, religion possesses its *own* domains of value and being, its own source of experience, which is called "grace" with regard to the individual person and "revelation" with regard to the collective person. True, philosophy can and should uncover the essence of this form of experience and the essence of its corresponding objects. But from its *own* form of experience and its own objects, philosophy has no access to the positing of the reality of a religious object or to the positive content factually experienced. Nevertheless, philosophy *itself* can show that it has not been a matter of historical accident that in all previous histories the structural forms of the worlds meant by world views of cultural units had their foundation in the structural forms of the domain meant by religious views of God, i.e., the domain of objects taken as holy.²¹⁴ And it can show that *all* meant world ethoses (including the ethos of society) have had their foundation in the ethos meant by religious views with regard both to types of acts and to act-correlates,²¹⁵ and that this relation is rooted in the nature of these objective domains and the corresponding forms of experience (including philosophical experience).²¹⁶ The *sociological*

213. [With regard to both the text and the preceding and following footnotes, see "Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens." See also "Vom Wesen der Philosophie" and "Probleme der Religion" (Bibliog. no. 14).—Ed.]

214. Since, as I maintain, philosophy *itself* can show this, it sets itself off autonomously from religion and church; i.e., philosophy is not heteronomously determined in its delineation by the church.

215. It is for the philosophy of religion to show this in a special study.

216. In particular, I believe that I can show (1) that all existence of objects is founded in their value-being; (2) that all cognition of an object and all willing of a project are founded in the love of the common contents of this object *and* this project; (3) that historically and nationally the

forms in which production of culture occurs (cognitional activity, artistic practice), among which the most dominant have thus far been the communal form of solidary positive cooperation and the societal form of individualistic and critical competition, are conditioned by primary changes in the sociological form of the *religious* spirit and its objective institutions, i.e., the church.²¹⁷ If we find community predominant *here*, then we also find it predominant in cognition and art; and if we find "society" (i.e., religious *sects*) predominant *here*, then we also find the predominance of *schools*, etc. (e.g., of philosophy).

A twofold task for the church could follow from this relationship between church and cultural collective person. First, there is the essentially *negative* task of immediately controlling all cultural collective activity and its works in order to see that the ethos of this activity and the guiding structure of the preferring of the values of the domain in question (style in the arts, the methodological structure of science) *do not conflict* with the conditions of a possible collective *salvation* and, if necessary, of issuing an authoritative declaration on the matter.²¹⁸ Second, there is the *positive* task of *inspiring* all cultural activity toward collective salvation through the spirit invested in the church as a holy collective person. But this "inspiration" is *not* a matter of *willing* and *not-willing*, and thus it is not dependent on the will of any ecclesiastical organ. It is an immediate *consequence* of this "spirit" itself, so that the degree and kind of such an inspiration become in certain cases a touchstone for measuring the authenticity and fullness of the spirit which is *present* in a

varying structures of worlds intended (meant) in all world views follow the structures of prevailing "moralities," and that the selective forms of given data follow so-called categories of directions of the love present; (4) that all possible love of the world is founded in the love of God, and all varying directions of love of the world in independently changing directions of the love of God.

217. Predominant traits of a communal form of cognition, as in the Middle Ages, are traditionalism (in the dimension of succession), unity of the language of learning throughout different nations, and, above all, the spiritual endeavor to build a *universal cognition* bridging ages and peoples. These traits are opposed in character to the predominantly *societal* form of cognition of modern times and the dominance of national languages in the sciences. [See "Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens." —Ed.]

218. *Philosophy* should be the means of such a correction, e.g., in (positive) science and art, because philosophy is a part of culture and has as its object the nature of all other areas *plus* the nature of religion and the church. Hence philosophy provides a possible *dialogue* in this sense (and only in this sense) between church and cultural systems. Of course, philosophy is not an *arbitrator* in this.

certain church, but which cannot be attributed to any disobedience or guilt of individuals. It is *not* in the nature of the church to give positive and moral *volitional* guidance or to settle objectives with respect to culture, which unfolds according to its own universally and individually valid laws. If a church attempts such interference, it claims control that contradicts its nature.

Hence the relationship between church and culture is essentially different from the relationship between *state* and culture. For the state has a task with respect to the concrete *goods* of culture only insofar as the values of right, well-being, and power are mirrored in cultural forms, and insofar as the cultural education of a people touches upon the realization of these values of the state and upon the basic civil tenor directed toward them (civil education, the art of government, the formation of offices)—that is, only insofar as culture is *not pure* culture, but culture that is *useful* in terms of the aims implicit in the nature of the state. In our terminology, the state has *no positive* task in realizing *cultural values as such*.²¹⁹ But the role of the state is all the more fundamental as the negative condition, and the *conditio sine qua non*, of the possible existence of a factual world of cultural goods, or, more precisely, of the *realization* of its collective cultural person's positive world of values as a collective world of goods, wherein the structure of the world of values determines the structure of the collective world of goods.²²⁰ The following propositions obtain in this context: (1) The freedom and independence of the state in relation to other states is the condition required for the cultural person, situated behind the state, to produce, according to its own proper spirit, a world of cultural goods corresponding to the state. This freedom and independence is also the condition required for this world of goods as a whole and for its *peculiarity* to receive recognition and adequate evaluation in the world.²²¹ Hence

219. Above all, the state has *no* task with regard to inspiration. A state culture is a contradiction in terms, and one should not speak of a cultural state.

220. Here, of course, we are not referring to the education of the individual. Education has a value totally independent of the conditions of the culture as a *whole* since it is independent of the state as well as changes in the conditions of the state.

221. This relation does *not* hold at all for goods pertinent to a civilized society. This kind of good can also be enhanced by slaves. The ability to enhance it is not dependent on a consciousness of freedom, on one's being a free citizen in a free state. Besides, these values are international and interstate, and men who produce them are always *replaceable*, irrespective of their nationality.

neither the singular *cultural works* belonging to this "world" (or their recognition) nor the culturally productive ability of the cultural person or the spiritual peculiarity of this ability perishes with the state. What perishes is the peculiar *world* of the *collective* power to effect this ability and its peculiarity. These collective values possess a value of their own. (2) Whereas it is true that extension of the domination of the state enlarges the field for propagating the cultural style of its cultural person, and that decreased domination restricts this style, this does not affect the peculiar cultural style either in its nature or in its value; nor do these events affect the ability of the cultural person. It is the factual distribution of these *styles* of collective values in real worlds of goods, which are found by the historian to be *already there*, that is, essentially affected by these processes. Each of the various realizations and distributions of possible cultural styles for and in real worlds of goods possesses its own autonomous (positive or negative) value, which is independent of the values of the *contents* of these styles. (3) The relations of power among life-communities within a state codetermine which special act-directions in the spirit of the cultural collective person will factually manifest themselves in cultural works. They also codetermine the selection of *what* will become real from possible "tastes" and from possible collective recognition of knowledge and a national form of sciences. (4) Collective well-being is essentially the condition of the *existence*, not of the quality, of the *possible* whole of cultural goods already selected according to (the consequences of) the first two conditions, i.e., according to the qualities of the collective cultural person and its peculiar world of values. (5) The forms of laws established by this state and pertaining to cultural goods codetermine the form of distribution of the participation of the state's population in the total culture. The state will do a *better* job in its task, which belongs essentially to it, of *realizing* culture, the *less* it claims autonomous guidance and leadership in cultural activities, the *less* it claims to inspire this activity, the *less* it follows a direct cultural policy (instead of a policy of power) toward other states, and the *less* it orders the relations of power among people living in its life-communities according to cultural points of view (propagation of education) rather than the point of view of justice.²²² Again, we find a case wherein the possible realization

222. I.e., the state must give life-communities equal or unequal rights according to their degree of significance with respect to the whole of the state.

of a certain value is tied to the condition that this value not be intended in an immediate fashion.

There are also certain a priori propositions which are founded in the essences of the types of collective persons (and other social units). These propositions deal with the *diversity* of these types.

Let us recall what we said about the simplicity and divisibility of value-modalities in part I of this treatise,²²³ i.e., their inherent ability to be identically experienced commonly, and let us see what follows from these propositions and from those that we can discover concerning the value-relatedness of forms of social unity. The highest modality in the order of ranks of values—the holy [*das Heilige*] as the value of the person [*Personwert*], and “salvation” [*das Heil*] as the value of the collective person, i.e., (solidary) collective salvation—is the most indivisible of the value-modalities and, for this very reason, the one that can be shared with others to the highest degree. The collective person to which collective salvation is directed can therefore only be *one* according to its *nature*. The unity of the church vis-à-vis the simultaneous plurality of collective cultural persons (a fortiori the other collective persons) is an a priori principle.²²⁴ The solidary inclusion of *all possible finite* persons in my salvation and of my salvation in the salvation of all finite persons belongs to the essence of the collective intention directed toward the value of all things lying in the absolute sphere of being and value. On the other hand, a *plurality* of *cultural* collective persons, in the sense of both simultaneous and successive plurality (in cultural units, nations, and cultural periods), belongs to the essence of this type of collective person in general. This plurality therefore does not belong to factors of race, milieu, nationality [*Volkstum*], etc., which obstruct the mere representation of the idea of culture and can be considered surmountable by history and possible progress in methods and social organizations. Plurality belongs to the *essence* of the idea of culture. The idea of a plurality of individual cultural collective persons as the bearers of individual collective cultural values is an idea that is constitutive of values of this type. The idea of *one* so-called world culture is therefore a priori “contradictory”; it is not a goal (not even a “utopian” one) that our spirit is supposed to posit for a form of history.²²⁵ The idea of a world-*state*, which Kant

223. See chap. 2, B, secs. 3, 5.

224. “Unity,” as opposed to plurality, must not be confused with the number 1; number is only a measure of plurality.

225. There exists a “cultural unit” when there is an identical structure

had to require because of his presuppositions, is even more contradictory than the idea of a *world culture*. Since every state, according to its essence, has a unitary cultural person as the background of its possible existence and ethos,²²⁶ and since the cultural person as a unit does *not* require a *state* as a unit for its existence, the plurality of states is *larger* than the *plurality* of collective cultural persons according to the essence of both the state and the collective cultural person.²²⁷ The same follows immediately from the mode of divisibility of the values to which the state is essentially directed. For these values are in essence values of the vital value-series, despite the spirituality of the state. Analogous relations of plurality obtain further for the state, for the people or groups of a predominantly life-communal character,²²⁸ and in the ultimate case for the life-community and society. The last point holds insofar as there are as many "real" units in a society as there are single persons. It is *because* society is in no way a collective reality that society itself and its subdivisions (e.g., classes) can penetrate all other collective realities; and it is because of this, too, that the idea of society as an artifact is the idea of a thing [*Sache*] that can be only *one*. The values to which society is directed are, however, the most divisible and the least subject to sharing. Indeed, there is absolutely no possible mutual living-with-one-another in such values, because each can have only *his* sensations of agreeableness and *his* interests, no matter how many people there may be who have the *same* interests. This similarity never creates solidarity, but at best a contractual working together on the part of many with the aim of realizing *one* purpose.

According to these central propositions concerning the theory

in the ways in which people look at the world as well as in the corresponding forms of being, and when there is an identical "ethos," but only when a reflective consciousness of this identity has *not* yet developed. This lack of reflection characterizes a nation. The existence of a national group of people always presupposes that they belong to *one* "cultural unit." Thus there cannot be more nations than cultural units.

226. This does not have to be a nation; it can also be a cultural unit.

227. The perfect national state is not a reality but only a guiding idea implicit in the essentially continuous transitions between social cultural units and in the essentially discontinuous cultural units among states. (No person can belong to two sovereign states!) Even if we imagine mankind divided up into a plurality of perfect national states, our proposition would hold true because there would be no cultural units.

228. One can conceive of a state with a plurality of life-communities, but not of a life-community which does not belong to a state. The possible plurality of life-communities is therefore larger than that of states.

of social diversity (not elaborated in detail here), there are also certain essential relations *among* and *within* social units. The *one* church is, according to its essence, both a *supranational*²²⁹ (and supracultural) collective person and, at the same time, a collective person *immanent* to all possible cultural units and nations. The church is non-national in a certain positive sense, in that it is simultaneously supranational and inherent in *all* cultural units. Society, on the other hand, although sharing with the church the formal moment of a potential unity = non-plurality (in the above sense) and non-nationality, is both *infra-national* and *international*.²³⁰ That is, society is immanent to *no* nation and *no* cultural unit, whereas the church is immanent to *each* nation and *each* cultural unit. Although formally similar to society, the church is the most *extreme* counterpart of society imaginable. In one we find solidarity, a collective person, and *one* collective salvation; in the other, contract and convention, a sum of individuals, and interests of many which fortuitously coincide or intersect.

Still, the (imperfect) collective cultural person of the cultural unit is both supranational and immanent with respect to nations, and the nation is in principle above and immanent to the state. Of course, the church is both above and immanent to the state (but only as *mediated* through the nation or the cultural unit).²³¹ Because the church is at the same time an intrastate institution, the state has the duty and the right to preserve its independence in all matters that are of a state-church "admixture" (the *jus circa sacra*), and the state has the duty to protect the church from attacks on the values and goods that the church represents. Finally, the cultural unit, the nation, the state, and the church are *jointly* above the life-communities (e.g., the peoples) in which they have their ordered places. Hence they

229. A national church is therefore an a priori contradiction.

230. All internationalism has its roots in international society. Internationalism is correctly referred to as "formal." To it belong the purely formal parts of so-called international law (to be distinguished from the "international law" of a cultural unit, for instance, of Europe), international private law, as well as all formal conventions concerning measures, weights, coins, etc., and all international "agreements" on technical and scientific symbols, terminologies, means of communication, etc. [See "Nation und ihre Querschichtungen," in "Soziologische Neuorientierung und die Aufgabe der deutschen Katholiken nach dem Kriege" (Bibliog. nos. 11, 19).—Ed.]

231. Hence a state church is a contradictory idea on the assumption of monotheism. The same holds for theocracy, as well as for a church which claims to be a state or to *govern* other states.

are in principle structures above peoples, but they are also immanent to peoples.²³²

Finally, these social units have a peculiar essential relation to the contents of the *spatial* and *temporal* manifold.

Each life-community possesses a common *environment* which each of its members can overlook and feel together. The life-community is adjusted to this environment not only in its vital feeling and vital striving but also in an objectively physiological sense, in that any transfer of a member of the life-community to another environment can be experienced, even without objective knowledge of this transfer, as a "yearning for" or "longing for" of a certain qualitative coloration. This environment, depending on the kind and complexity of the life-community in question, is called "dwelling place" (family), "home" (local commune), or "fatherland" (people).²³³ If values and dis-values as targets of this yearning and longing (which is consciously set off only by a *change* in the common environment) become especially clear, and if this whole, founded in values, is comprehended, there springs forth *love* for the abode (for "tent" or "house"), *love* for one's home, and *love* for the fatherland.²³⁴ What is essential to the state at each moment of its existence is a so-called *territory* and its frontiers. Of course the unity of the *state* is not established through natural determinations of spatial extension. The territory is the field of its will of domination and is *posited* by the state itself. The territory is the solid surface belonging as an objective corporeal correlate to the *common* environment of the life-communities governed by the state.²³⁵

232. See what I have said in the January, 1916, issue of the monthly journal *Hochland* on these fundamental relations among social units. [See "Soziologische Neuorientierung."—Ed.]

233. On home and fatherland, see *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle*.

234. These types of love are quite independent of the *positive* value-content of the environment. I.e., one loves one's home and country, not because they happen to be "beautiful," "fertile," "rich," etc., but *because* they are home and country. This vital emotive and conative basis of these types of love certainly belongs to higher animals.

235. All of this would hold also for a migrating horde or for a group divided up into statelike units and living on ships. In the first case the territory would continually change, but would nevertheless exist. In the second case the decks of the ships would form the territory. Many have tried to deny the essential necessity of a territory with regard to the state. To us this is a hopeless undertaking. If one were to pursue such an attempt consistently, it would lead to anarchism, i.e., to the dissolution of the state into a society that would exist only in terms of legal contractual relations. But the territories of more than one state can coincide in the case where a plurality of states is unified into a so-called federal republic so that the

The different environments can *overlap*, but territories cannot, for they exclude each other as every section of space excludes every other section. On the other hand, the cultural collective person, the nation, and the cultural unit require *neither* an environment *nor* a territory. Their member-persons can change their residence, home, fatherland, and state without unbinding their national ties. Thus the nation is shown to be a predominantly *spiritual* reality. Yet one cannot say that the cultural collective person is ubiquitous. It essentially possesses a certain *field of effectiveness* that is at every moment spatial, but in such a way that the fields of a plurality of nations can intersect in the same objective segments of space (and their content). They do not exclude each other, as territories do; nor do they necessarily change along with migrations of the lived bodies of their members, i.e., *through* the migrations, as environments of life-communities do. The church, as the pure and perfect collective person in which the salvation of all finite persons is solidary, has a unique relation to space. Its field of effectiveness is both supraspatial and intraspatial. It is supraspatial because it encompasses not only all finite living persons but also (in given cases) non-humans (the idea of angels) as well as deceased persons. And it gathers the latter, together with all finite persons living in inner space, into a solidary unity. Hence the church, by virtue of its *essence*, lacks the essential parts of the life-community, the state, and the nation: a *special* environment, a *special* territory, and a *special* spatial field of effectiveness. But it *sanctifies* every territory into which a finite person may enter, every environment, and every field of effectiveness.²³⁶ And precisely because the church encompasses the realm of finite individual persons, it is not necessary that *one* of its historical forms also encompass all "humanity" precisely as "society" does. A historically positive church therefore must not tend to go in a dangerous direction leading away from its true essence, namely, to assume structures (in contents of faith, ethics, and institutions) that *can* encompass "all humanity." Such a tendency

territory of the member-state is at the same time a territory of the republic. We will not discuss the question of whether the member-state, no longer sovereign, can still be called a state, i.e., the problem of the state in a republic.

236. However, this does not rule out the fact that the places in which a church manifests its effectiveness for the sake of a common salvation (e.g., "churches," "holy places," etc.) still assume a special character of the value of the "holy" which is not yet given with general religious observance.

necessarily leads to a false and pernicious adaptation of the church to the "universal" human nature of a humanity that has *not* yet been religiously transformed. A church that pursues this course will finally *drown* in the sphere of society and ultimately in the mass and will move away from its true goal, which is to *elevate* everything human according to its present dispositions [*Anlagen*] to the sphere of solidarity in love among all finite persons. The church must not assume a priori that everyone who belongs to the natural species "man" is also *necessarily* an individual person, i.e., one who belongs to the church's field, or that every such man must be able to understand the doctrines of the church.²³⁷ This depends on the church's missionary experiences and is no a priori principle.²³⁸ In this respect society is quite different from the church. Because society is the social unit that can penetrate all other social units, it has no spatial ties other than those which are posited by the resident beings who can make contracts about matters concerning their individual interests and the essentially singular values of the agreeable and the useful. And since society *consists in* the validity of such contractual relations alone, it has a *non-spatial* character. And it is only insofar as the ideas of society and contract presuppose the life-community in general that society indirectly partakes in the environment of the widest life-community existing between beings of such a nature. This life-community is mankind as a *real species* [*Gattung*], which is of course different from the sum of men and the concept of man. The environment of this life-community is the earth. Society is therefore, when viewed from its spatial field, the *earthly* social unit par excellence.²³⁹

Analogous essential relations obtain between social units and the *temporality* of their spheres of being and effectiveness. No matter how long or short the objective time which a factual social unit occupies may be, each social unit has a necessary claim to a longer or shorter *duration* with respect to other units. We saw in part I that there are "durabilities" proper to the natures of the value-modalities themselves, and that the higher the values, the more they can endure. The social unit of society is *without* duration; and, as opposed to all other social units related to values,

237. The degree to which the church in fact encompasses humanity has no bearing on how much the essence of the church can be purely exemplified in humanity.

238. At best, this principle could belong to positive dogma, but not to philosophy.

239. [It appears to us that Scheler should have said that *community* is this, but in every edition the word used is *Gesellschaft*.—*Trans.*]

society has *no* temporal dimension to its existence. Hence society only encompasses men living at the same time. Contracts with the deceased or with men of the future do not exist.²⁴⁰ The validity of contracts (and not only the conclusions of contracts) presupposes the simultaneous existence of their subjects, no matter to what extent the contractual content may relate to specifications for what will or will not happen in the future. In contrast to this, life-communities possess by nature a duration that goes beyond the duration of existence of any of their members. In the family, the tribe, the home, and the people there live a peculiar "spirit" (love and hate, "prejudice") and will which have continuity in comparison with the discrete times of the members of a life-community.²⁴¹ This spirit, with its structure, has its own value or disvalue independent of the value of the sum of the acts of its members. The state is more enduring than the life-communities corresponding to the sphere of its will of domination. The cultural unit and the nation are more enduring than the state. And the church is more enduring than the cultural unit and the nation. The sequence from life-community to church shows an increasing concentration, preservation, and deepening of the sense of collective acts, themselves separated in time, of real social units. It is as if the collective life of a lower social unit were preserved in higher units according to its value for the collective life of the realm of persons. Only the church, and not merely its origin but also its sphere, is at the same time *supratemporal* and *intratemporal*. Its claim to "eternal" duration belongs to its essence. But the historical change of cultural collective persons and of the worlds of goods which they encompass belongs to the essence of these collective existences. An "eternal nation" is *contradictory* (not merely "impossible" in reality). Still more contradictory is an "eternal state."²⁴² For inasmuch as the

240. When one of the partners to an agreement concerning succession dies, the agreement does not become a contract *between* the survivor and the deceased. According to its content, it only defines the capacity of the one upon the death of the other.

241. This continuity is of the same nature as that of vital feeling in relation to changing sensible feeling-states.

242. The false assumption of such an eternal nation or state would also lead to a deadly conservatism that would obstruct a total explication of the inner possibilities of the spirit which forms culture and states. Every ethics of state or culture is therefore *eo ipso* "reactionary." Rather, there is a *moral* right to both cultural revolution and revolution against the state—the former on the basis of a new level of the collective consciousness of religious and ecclesiastical matters, the latter on the basis of a new cultural idea.

state is related to essentially "temporal" goods, the state's own existence necessarily partakes in this temporality. But it does so in a way that differs essentially from the case of the existence of the cultural person. The cultural collective person and the state are basically related in such a way that the cultural person can "survive" the state.²⁴³ The collapse of a state's organization does not entail the collapse of the cultural person. Indeed, the latter may bring about new state structures to replace the old, collapsing ones.²⁴⁴

ad 5. Intimate Person and Social Person

No matter how rich and diverse the memberships through which *each* person is enmeshed in the whole of the moral cosmos, and no matter how diverse the directions of the various kinds of coresponsibility by which the person is tied to this *whole* and its direction and sense, the person is never exhausted by these kinds of membership, nor is his self-responsibility reduced to various coresponsibilities, nor his duties and rights to those duties and rights which derive from such memberships (duties of family, office, vocation, citizenship, class, etc.). For behind all experience that enters into these memberships and obstructs or furthers the person as a whole by realizing these memberships, everyone feels (in some measure)—if he attempts to have a clear view of the whole of these kinds of membership and of his own being—a *peculiar self-being* (similarly, a self-value and a self-disvalue) which towers above this whole and in which he knows himself (descriptively speaking) *alone*. And what comes to givenness in this essential form of possible self-experiencing is what I call the *intimate person*. I wish to distinguish this sharply from the contents of experience of all forms of self-experiencing that occur with an explicit or somehow cogiven reference to the mere bearer-being of some personal membership, i.e., the *social person*. We can say, therefore, that every finite and complete person possesses an intimate sphere and a social one. The col-

243. On the very peculiar (and little-investigated) relation of the idea of the afterlife of the person in general beyond death to the idea of the afterlife of the individual person beyond his lived body, as well as to the idea of the afterlife of the collective person beyond its member-persons, see my essay, "Die Idee des Todes und das Fortleben." In this essay I discuss the vast difference between Leibniz (Herder) and Kant on whether all moral life consists in a movement of infinite perfection of the individual soul beyond life or in devotion to the collective persons which survive the earthly life of the individual. [See above, p. 302, n. 78.—Ed.]

244. [See "Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens."—Ed.]